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, Case No 
y 
57116 
B R I E F O F P L A I N T I F F and R E S P O N D E N T 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This was an action by the Plaintiff-Respondent 
(hereinafter called Kay Goff or Plaintiff) against De-
fendant-Appellant (hereinafter called Annette Doble 
Goff or Defendant) for damages for personal injury 
sustained by the Plaintiff arising out of an automobile 
accident which occurred on the 22nd day of January, 
1973, near the outskirts of Salt Lake City. (At the time 
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of the accident, Annette Doble Goff was the fiancee 
of one of the Plaintiff's sons. They were married sub-
sequent to the accident, but before the action was filed). 
The sole issue involved before the Trial Court which 
is involved in this appeal concerns the question whether 
or not the Plaintiff was a guest at the time of the acci-
dent as defined in 41-9-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The trial was heard in this case on September 10, 
1974, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, in and for 
Weber County, Utah, sitting without a jury, the same 
having been waived by both parties. 
On the 20th day of September, 1974, Judge Gould 
issued a Memorandum Decision in which he found in 
favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and 
thereafter a formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment were entered consistent with Judge 
Gould's Memorandum Decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the Judgment 
rendered by Judge Gould affirmed in favor of the 
Plaintiff and Against the Defendant. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent agrees with the Statement of 
Facts set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
P R E S U M P T I O N S FAVOR CORRECT-
N E S S A N D C R E D I B I L I T Y OF T H E 
F I N D I N G S A N D J U D G M E N T O F 
T H E T R I A L COURT. T H E B U R D E N 
O F S H O W I N G T H A T T H E Y A R E I N 
E R R O R I S U P O N T H E ATTACKER. 
The Utah Supreme Court in First Security Bank 
of Utah, N.A. vs. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, held at Page 
567, 
"Applicable to the various points discussed 
here is the traditional rule of review: that the 
presumptions favor the correctness and credi-
bility of the findings and judgment; and that 
the burden of showing they are in error and 
should be overturned is upon the attacker." 
The only factual issue in dispute at the trial level was 
whether or not the Plaintiff was a guest within the 
meaning of the tUah Statute which states as follows: 
"41-9-2. 'Guestf defined — For the purpose 
of this section the term 'guest' is hereby defined 
as being a person who accepts a ride in any 
vehicle without giving compensation therefor." 
There is no real dispute as to the status of the law in 
this State. We accept the Court's prior decision in Smith 
vs. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P.2d 541 (1962), 
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"The test is simple to state and under most 
circumstances is easy to apply: a passenger for 
hire is one who pays for his ride; a guest is one 
who is furnished a ride free of charge. The 
former is in the nature of a business transaction 
for money; whereas the latter is motivated by 
other considerations, usually of a social nature. 
Difficulties are encountered where both fac-
tors are present in such a way that it does not 
appear with sufficient certainty to justify a 
ruling as a matter of law either that the rider 
was a guest or a passenger for hire. Where 
such uncertainty exists, the definition given 
by Sec. 41-9-2, U.C.A. 1953, that a guest is 'a 
person who accepts a ride in any vehicle with-
out giving 'compensation' therefor, does not 
provide the conclusive answer. The question 
arises as to what constitutes 'compensation' suf-
ficient to change what normally would be a 
guest to a passenger for hire. 
I t must be conceded that where it is shown 
that the rider is basically a social guest, neither 
the giving of just any 'compensation,' which 
might be some inconsequential amount of 
money or other consideration of value, nor 
even the sharing of expenses, merely in social 
reciprocation for the ride, would change the 
relationship to that of passenger for hire. The 
phrase 'compensation therefor' as used in the 
statute means compensation for the ride. 
Therefore, it would have to be sufficient money 
'or other thing of value' that is reasonably 
could be supposed that the parties so regarded 
it. But whether there is profit in the transac-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tion is obviously not the determining factor. 
Where payment for the ride is the main induce-
ment for it, the fact that there may also exist 
some social incentive which makes giving the 
ride enjoyable or desirable for the driver would 
not change its character to that of host and 
guest." 
"Howsoever convenient or expedient it 
may be to see things as either black or white 
and to avoid perplexing problems in the twi-
light areas of uncertainty, that cannot always 
be done. Where both payment and social in-
centive are present, and the evidence would 
support a finding that each exerted a substan-
tial influence on hauling the passenger, the 
problem as to the relationship between the par-
ties must be faced up to and resolved by sub-
mititng the issue to the jury (or fact trier), 
(emphasis added) 
From our consideration of this subject and 
the authorities which have dealt with it, we 
are persuaded that the sound and practical 
view is that the determination should be made 
on the basis of which was the chief inducement 
for giving the ride." 
Assuming the test is not what is the "main induce-
ment" but in fact what is the "chief inducement", as 
suggested by the Defendant-Appellant, the decision of 
the Trial Court was correct in view of the totality of 
the circumstances. 
Counsel has cited other cases in which the parties 
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were clearly social guests and the whole purpose of the 
venture was clearly social in nature. There are many 
factors to distinguish the case now before the Court 
from the other cases in which the Courts have found 
the injured passenger to be a guest. Facts that distin-
guish the present case are: 
1. The purpose of the trip for everyone in the 
automobile, with the exception of the Plaintiff and his 
wife, was to attend a Tupperware meeting in Salt Lake 
City. (T. 20) The purpose of the trip for the Plaintiff 
was to visit the hospital in Salt Lake City. Therefore, 
the incentive for travelling to Salt Lake City was dif-
ferent for the Plaintiff. The other persons in the auto-
mobile intended to part company with the Plaintiff upon 
their arrival in Salt Lake City. 
2. The ride was solicited by the Plaintiff. (T.9) 
Five Dollars, ($5.00) were paid in advance of the trip 
by the Plaintiff's wife. (T. 29) 
3. John took the money, departed from his fath-
er's home in Riverdale, and journeyed to 12th Street 
and Wall Avenue, Ogden, Utah, some substantial dis-
tance from his father's home where he secured gasoline 
at a cost of $4.00, pocketing the remaining $1.00 which 
he used for lunch at a later time during the week. (T. 
24-29) 
4. After leaving the gas station, John picked up 
all of the other persons who were to accompany him 
to Salt Lake with the exception of his mother and 
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father. They all lived reasonably close to the gas station 
on 12th and Wall Avenue, where the gas was secured. 
(T. 30) 
5. The most expeditious or convenient route for 
John and the others to journey to Salt Lake was to get 
on the freeway at 24th Street, avoid the traffic of Wall 
Avenue, Riverdale, Road, etc., and proceed directly to 
Salt Lake City. (T.31) 
6. I t was substantially out of their way to return 
to the Goff home to pick up the Plaintiff and his wife. 
The route of travel required travelling south on Wall 
Avenue, then on to Riverdale Road, leaving Riverdale 
Road and travelling one mile from Riverdale Road to 
the Goff home, then returning over that distance of 
one mile back to Riverdale Road and proceeding to 
Salt Lake City. (T. 8) 
7. John had to go out of his way, accept incon-
venience, and accept delay in time in order to provide 
the transportation to his father and mother. When asked 
why he returned to the Goff home, he stated clearly, 
"Because they paid me the money". (T. 3) 
In the Smith case, Justice Crockett said, 
"The phrase, 'compensation therefor', as used 
in the statute means compensation for the ride. 
Therefore, it would have to be sufficient money 
(or other thing of value) that it reasonably 
could be supposed that the parties so regarded 
it." (Emphasis added) 
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This Court in Charlton vs. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 
389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961) said, 
"In considering the attack on the findings and 
judgment of the trial court it is our duty to 
follow these cardinal rules of review: to in-
dulge them a presumption of validity and cor-
rectness; to require the appellant to sustain 
the burden of showing error; to review the 
record in the light most favorable to them; 
and not to disturb them if they find substan-
tial support in the evidence." (Emphasis 
added) 
From the evidence adduced at the trial, this Court 
can find substantial support for Judge Gould's deter-
mination that the payment of $5.00 was sufficient com-
pensation that the parties regarded it to be of sufficient 
value to cause John to return to the home of his father 
and provide transportation for him to Salt Lake City. 
John and the others would have gone to Salt Lake 
City with or without the father. Their business there 
was completely separate and independent from the bus-
iness of the Plaintiff. True, the payment of money had 
nothing whatever to do with their journey to Salt Lake 
City, but it obviously had everything to do with their 
return to the Goff residence to pick up the Plaintiff. 
The evidence would indicate that it was not only the 
main inducement, or the chief inducement, but was in 
all likelihood the only inducement for their return to 
the Goff home and to provide transportation to Salt 
Lake City. These are the facts consistent with the testi-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mony and the findings of the Court, and they ought not 
be lightly overturned. The presumption is for correct-
ness and credibility of the findings of the Trial Court 
and the Defendant-Appellant has not met their bur-
den. 
P O I N T I I 
T H I S COURT S H O U L D V I E W T H E 
E V I D E N C E I N A L I G H T MOST FAV-
O R A B L E TO T H E P L A I N T I F F - R E -
S P O N D E N T TO S U S T A I N T H E 
F I N D I N G S OF T H E L O W E R COURT. 
The above-stated principle was enunciated in Hardy 
vs. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28, (1972), 
where the Court said. 
"On appeal evidence is viewed in light most 
favorable to sustain the lower court, and the 
findings will not be disturbed unless they are 
clearly against the weight of the evidence or 
it manifestly appears that the court misap-
plied the law to the established facts." 
If the Court views the evidence most favorable to 
the Plaintiff-Respondent, we must conclude that the 
purpose for the trip to Salt Lake City for Annette, 
Diane and John was to attend the Tupperware meet-
ing, and that they would have gone to Salt Lake whether 
or not the Plaintiff was in the automobile. 
At no time has the Plaintiff implied that this was 
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a joint business trip between the Plaintiff and the other 
people. The Plaintiff's business was with the Railroad 
Retirement Board, the other persons involved had busi-
ness dealing with a Tupperware meeting. 
The sole question was " Why did John Goff and his 
girlfriend, and the girlfriend of his brother, return to 
the Goff home to pick up the Plaintiff, after they had 
already left, secured gasoline, and were in a position 
to secure easy acces sto the Freway and the immediate 
trip to Salt Lake City?" John said it was because his 
father gave him $5.00. (T. 31) 
On cross-xamination John admitted that he would 
not turn his father down simply because he didn't give 
him money. The payment of money was obviously an 
established pattern with the Plaintiff because he could 
not drive. (T. 9) And, he didn't want to be a free loader 
either. (T. 18) 
We are concerned here with the isolated incident 
of returning to the Goff home to pick up the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant in his brief suggests that this was a close 
family and that the transaction was a social one. I t 
should be remembered, that although the Defendant 
now is a daughter-in-law of the Plaintiff, she was not 
married to the Plaintiff's son at the time of the acci-
dent and John was not married to Diane at the time of 
the accident. These were young people who were girl-
friends and boyfriends and who in all likelihood antici-
pated marriage, but the record is void of any evidence 
to indicate that there was some social benefit to these 
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young people to bring along a chaperon. The facts in-
dicate that it was inconvenient to return to the Goff 
residence. I t was more expedient to get on the freway 
at 24th Street or some other point. Even after they re-
turned to Riverdale Road the Goff home was a mile 
from the road. (T. 8) The Plaintiff-Respondent sug-
gests that John Goff, who is an uneducated young man, 
who now makes his living as a garbage collector, but 
who at the time of the accident was a janitor, told the 
truth at the time of trial and responded to the questions 
in a very forthright and candid manner, and when asked 
the reason for return, stated that it was the money 
that induced him to do so. He did not say that it was 
one of the reasons, or a main reason, or the chief reason, 
it was stated by him as the only reason, but counsel 
would now have use read into that answer something 
other than the facts stated by the witness. 
The Court observed the witnesses, their demeanor, 
their frankness, their candor and made a finding of fact 
based upon that testimony. The finding was clearly 
that, the payment of money was the inducement for 
furnishing carriage to Kay Goff, transporting him to 
Salt Lake City. Admittedly, it was not the inducement 
for John, Diane, or Annette travelling to Salt Lake 
City, that is not the issue, but it was the inducement 
for them to return to the Goff home and transport the 
Plaintiff to Salt Lake City. 
The thrust of the Appellant's Brief is to convince 
the Court that the Appellant should have won the case. 
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This Court clearly stated in Brigham vs. Moon Lake 
Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393, 
at Page 397, (1970), 
"On appeal, the burden is upon the appellant 
to convince us that the trial court committed 
error and not that the appellant should have 
won the case . . . " 
In the separate opinion by Justice Ellett, he stated, 
"When we on this court try to do justice in a 
law case, we become jurors and thereby give 
notice to litigants that if they are dissatis-
fied with the judgment below, they can have 
a new trial by appealing, and if W E do not 
think they got a just verdict below, we still 
see that they get it regardless of whether there 
were any errors of law committed during the 
trial. That is too great a burden for and not a 
function of this court. We should not reverse 
the trial court simply because we disagree 
with the jury." 
This same concept is applicable to cases tried by a Court 
without a jury. 
Appellants have shown no errors in law, they have 
simply implied that their client should have won at the 
trial, and their reference to the responsibility of the 
insurance company to pay the claim, and the fact that 
the parties are now related by the marriage of the Plain-
tiff's son, are only intended to obscure the issue and are 
certainly immaterial. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no dispute between the parties as to the 
status of the law in determining when a person is a 
guest within the meaning of the statute. And where 
both payment of money and some social incentive are 
present, that problem must be resolved by the trier of 
fact, in this case, Judge Gould, sitting without a jury. 
Likewise, there can be no dispute as to the law rel-
ative to the presumptions that favor correctness of the 
findings of fact and the judgment of the trial court, or 
as to the nature of the burden of the Defendant-Appel-
lant when that finding is challenged. True, there may 
have been some social incentive, although the evidence 
does not so indicate. The evidence is clear as to why 
transportation was furnished to the Plaintiff. That evi-
dence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff and we should presume the correctness of the 
findings of the trial court. The decision of the trial 
court should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MECHAM & RICHARDS 
By: RICHARD RICHARDS 
2506 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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